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 Federal Rule of Evidence 609, Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal Conviction, allows the litigating 
parties to attack a witness’s “character for truthfulness” [1] by evidence of a criminal conviction at trial.[2] The 
rule allows a witness’s prior felony conviction[3] or any conviction that involved a dishonest act or false 
statement[4] to be admitted by a trial judge for impeachment purposes. Often defendant-witnesses are the most 
affected by this rule because it allows jurors to make a propensity inference about the defendant’s (un)truthful 
character, although it may not actually be representative of their character or probative of the crime at hand. 
There is a high prejudicial effect of allowing previous convictions to be admitted into evidence because the jury is 
allowed to make inferences that witnesses testimony is untrue because they were once convicted of a crime, and 
therefore they must not be telling the truth now. There is a double-edged sword here: the defendant can choose 
not to testify, which may make him appear guilty in the eyes of the jury, or he can testify, but he runs the risk of 
being impeached for his prior convictions. The admission of prior conviction evidence contributes to a system that 
disfavors criminal defendants and disproportionately impacts people of color.[5]  
 The implications that FRE 609 has on witnesses is prejudicial, but when considering the witness’s race, the 
impact becomes greater. Race is significant in criminal law because the rates in which Black people are arrested, 
convicted, and sentenced[6] are disproportionately higher. Race plays a large role in which groups of people are 
convicted for crimes and longer sentencing terms.[7] Mass incarceration, over-policing, and prosecutorial biases 
are just a few reasons why Black people receive harsher sentences compared to those of white people.[8] There is a 
tumultuous history of Black peoples’ experiences with law enforcement in America that has ultimately affected 
their experiences within the legal system. Black criminal defendants frequently deal with “inadequate provision of 
defense counsel” and an “overwhelming pressure to plead guilty,”[9] which contributes to higher convictions as 
well.  If one group of people has more run-ins with the law, it is more likely that if a subset of those people become 
witnesses in a trial (as a character witness or defendant-witness), their prior conviction can be used to taint their 
credibility. This is an exceptionally prejudicial flaw with this rule, because although the ostensible purpose of the 
rule is to allow parties to use established social norms of truthfulness, i.e. prior criminal convictions, to attack  the 
witness’s character for truthfulness, there are other factors that are implicitly considered by the jury. The impact 
this rule has on witnesses of differing races is not uniform and often has very little, if any, probative value.[10] 
 Once a person is convicted for a crime punishable for over a year, FRE 609 inherently deems them as an 
untruthful person from that day forward, opening the door for attacks on their propensity for truthfulness. Since 
juries have the final say, many defendants with prior convictions may not testify to avoid impeachment altogether.
[11] The fear of juror misuse allows courts to provide limiting instructions[12] to distill the jury’s fact-finding and 
decision-making process if it has been tainted, but juries will ultimately decide whether a witness or criminal 
defendant is credible or not. Usually this results in convictions once a jury understands that a defendant waived 
his right to testify although they may not know it was “strategically” decided to prevent impeachment because they 
understand not testifying indicative of guilt.[13] This further perpetuates an unfortunate and all too common cycle 
of conviction, recidivism, and impeachment of prior conviction for Black criminal defendants. A possible solution 
to the harmful effects of this rule would be to eliminate FRE 609 as a rule because its prejudicial effect outweighs 
its probative value, or to limit the admission of prior convictions for specific crimes. People have the ability to 
change, rehabilitate, and grow from their previous past crimes. Leaving the fate of a trial based on a Black criminal 
defendant’s prior conviction in the hands of the jury is dangerous because race will play a major role, whether 
implicitly or not. The prior crime is not always indicative of someone’s ability to tell the truth, and should not be 
used to impair Black defendants’ present or future conviction. 
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